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"Aggravated Felons"
ABSTRACT

Any foreign national who is convicted of an "aggravated
felony," as that term is defined in the Immigration and
NationalityAct, is subject to deportationfrom the United States.
Deportation of so-called "aggravated felons" is in no way
contingent upon the particular facts and circumstances in a
given case. More troublingly, on the judiciary has no authority
to review a deportation order based "aggravated felony"
grounds. In the past decade, Congress has expanded the
definition of "aggravated felony" to encompass many minor
crimes that are neither aggravatednor felonious.
The deportationof foreign nationals on "aggravatedfelony"
grounds is effectively mandatory, and as such does not comport
with international human rights principles. A number of
treaties and other instruments of internationallaw that have
been ratified by the United States are in tension with this
deportation scheme. Provisions of these instruments that run
contrary to the current regime include a prohibitionon arbitrary
expulsion, a bar on the return of refugees except where national
security and public safety require,an absolute bar on the return
of any person who would be subject to torture in her home
country, and the recognition of an individual's right not to
suffer undue governmental interference with his family and
private life. The automatic deportation of foreign nationals
convicted of "aggravated felonies" is also at odds with
constitutionalguaranteesof due process.
In order to reconcile the statutory authorization of the
removal of foreign nationalsfor "aggravatedfelony" convictions
with international law, Congress should revise the relevant
statutes to require a balancing of public safety concerns against
the hardship to the deportee and his resident family members,
and Congress should reinstate judicial review of deportation
orders based on "aggravatedfelony" convictions. To preserve
genuine rights of due process, the courts must make a
fundamental change in their analysis of deportation cases by
departing from the traditional characterization of deportation
as a non-punitive sanction.

1619

1620

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:1619

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................
H ISTORY .........................................................................

A.
B.
C.
III.

B.

IV.

MandatoryDeportationof CriminalForeign
Nationals Poses Potential Conflicts with
InternationalHuman Rights Law .....................
1.
The Refugee Protocol .............................
2.
The Convention against Torture ..........
3.
The Universal Declaration of
H um an Rights ........................................
4.
The United States' Conflicting
Interest in Compliance with
International Law and Sovereignty
in the Field of Immigration ...................
MandatoryDeportationRaises Significant
Legal and Policy Concerns within the
Dom estic A rena ...................................................

COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATION ..........................

A.
B.
C.

V.

Overview of Recent Changes to Immigration
Law ConcerningStatus of CriminalForeign
N ationals.............................................................
1628
Expansion of the Meaning of 'Aggravated
F elony".................................
...............................
1629
Eliminationof the 212(c) Waiver and the
Introductionof its Replacement, 240A
Cancellationof Removal .....................................
1633

A NALYSIS .......................................................................

A.

1621
1628

Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights and the Deportationof
CriminalForeign Nationals...............................
DeportingCriminalForeign Nationalsin
the United Kingdom ...........................................
Congress Should Amend the Deportation
Scheme of CriminalForeign Nationals,
Borrowing the Basic Structure of the
United Kingdom's CorrespondingProvision.....

CONCLUSION ..................................................................

1636

1636
1636
1641
1644

1645
1648
1650
1650
1651

1652
1654

20031
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Few punishments are more drastic than expelling persons from
this country when their family members are residents" according to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 Yet during the last decade,
Congress has enacted and amended legislation that mandates
deportation for many long-time, lawful residents with strong family
ties in the United States when these non-citizen residents have been
convicted of certain criminal offenses. 2 To many, the deportation of
criminal foreign nationals may appear to be an exercise of good policy
whatever the extent to which such foreign nationals have established
personal, professional, or family lives in this country. It is difficult to
say that a policy of expelling non-citizens convicted of serious crimes
within the United States is improper. Such non-citizens may be
perceived justifiably to pose an intolerable threat to both U.S. citizens
and resident non-citizens. People expect the government to protect
them from dangerous foreign nationals; this expectation is
particularly evident in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks and the
3
perceived ongoing threat of future terrorist activity.
Upon examination of the statutes governing criminal grounds for
deportation a significant problem emerges: the category for
deportation-triggering offenses is so broad that it includes many
crimes that bear little, if any, relation to an actual threat to public
safety. 4 Because the current statutes can result in essentially
automatic deportation of foreign nationals for convictions as minor as

1.
Yepes-Prado v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 1363,1369 n.11 (9th Cir. 1993).
2.
Deportation under the current statutory scheme is not absolutely
mandatory, because the INS still exercises discretion over when and whether it will
institute deportation proceedings against non-citizens who are rendered deportable by
a criminal conviction. U.S. v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2002); Johns v. Dept. of
Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1981).
3.
See Romesh Ratnesar, The State of Our Defense, TIME, Feb. 24, 2003, at 24
("While the Administration demonstrated again last week its determination to remind
Americans of the dangers of terrorism, it has done far less to prepare the country for
actually defending against it . . . [B]ad guys may still be slipping in-or eluding
detection."); U.S. Newswire, CIS: 800,000 Plus Illegals Entering Annually in Late '90s;
New INS Report Also Finds 80,000 from Middle East (Feb. 4, 2003) available at
http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=116-02042003
("We can't protect
ourselves from terrorism without dealing with illegal immigration.")
4.
Few would argue that a foreign national who twice jumps a New York City
subway turnstile poses a threat to public safety, but in Mojica v. Reno, a district court
noted that such an offender is subject to automatic deportation. 970 F. Supp. 130, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that turnstile jumping qualifies as a "crime of moral
turpitude," and thus subjects an offender to automatic deportation under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
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petty theft, 5 urinating in public, 6 and the forgery of a check for less
than twenty dollars, 7 many scholars and practitioners disparage the
8
utility of such a sweeping mandatory deportation scheme.
A particularly compelling example of the severity of the current
criminal alien deportation statutes is found in the case of Jose
Velasquez. 9 Velasquez, a native of the Republic of Panama, was born
to a member of the Panamanian diplomatic service in 1947.10 His
mother was a U.S. citizen. 11 During his childhood, Velasquez
frequently accompanied his father to the United States for extended,
official visits. 12 In 1960, at the age of thirteen, Velasquez was
admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. 13 At
that time, he elected to stay in the United States to complete his high
school education at West Catholic High School in Philadelphia,
despite his father's departure from the United States. 14 Since 1960,
he has continuously resided in the United States. 15 Both of
Velasquez's older siblings are U.S. citizens, as are his wife of thirtyfour years and his three adult children.' 6 For many years, he
operated a delicatessen in Philadelphia, and he owns a home with his
wife in Pennsylvania. 17 Removal proceedings were initiated against
Velasquez in 1998, when he returned to the United States after a
brief trip to Panama to visit his mother, who was undergoing hip-

5.
See Nancy Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 Deportation
Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000)
(referring to a Third Circuit holding that a conviction for the misdemeanor of petty
theft constitutes an aggravated felony).
6.
See Lise Olsen, Deportee Struggles to Find a Life in a 'Foreign' Land,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 30, 2003, at P-I (stating that one of fifty-six
criminal aliens returned to Cambodia after that country began accepting deportees in
2002).
7.
After residing in the United States since her early childhood, Xuan Wilson
faced automatic deportation for a nine-year-old forgery conviction, involving a check for
$19.38. See Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets Immigration
Law's New AggravatedFelons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 591 (1998).
8.
See generally id.; Lisa R. Fine, Preventing Miscarriages of Justice:
Reinstating the Use of "JudicialRecommendations Against Deportation," 12 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 491 (1998); Hakeem Ishola, INS v. St. Cyr: The Supreme Court and
Draconian Congressional Criminal-ImmigrationLaws, 14 UTAH B.J. 8 (Dec. 2001);
Morawetz, supra note 5; Kathleen O'Rourke, Deportability, Detention and Due Process:
An Analysis ofRecent Tenth Circuit Decisions in ImmigrationLaw, 79 DENV. U. L. REV.
353 (2002).
9.
Velasquez v. Reno, 37 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664 (D.N.J. 1999).
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Velazquez, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
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replacement surgery.' 8 Upon his arrival at Newark Airport,
Velasquez was taken into INS custody. 19
The grounds for Velasquez's removal were Section 212(a)(2)(C) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which renders excludable
"an alien who has been, or has aided or conspired with, an illicit
Section
and INA
substance,"
in a
controlled
trafficker
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which renders excludable "an alien who has been
convicted of. .. a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, a state or
federal law relating to a controlled substance. '20 The drug convictions
that compelled Velasquez's removal occurred nearly two decades
earlier, when he pled guilty to two charges, conspiracy to sell and the
sale or delivery of a controlled substance. 21 The facts surrounding the
guilty plea were uncontested by the INS. 22 In 1980, Velasquez was
approached by a friend at a party who asked Velasquez if he sold
cocaine. 23 Velasquez answered that he did not, but he indicated
another man at the party who might be selling it.2 4 No evidence
suggested that Velasquez expected compensation for any subsequent
transaction between his friend and the man who Velasquez pointed to
as a possible source of the drug. 25 After he entered his guilty plea,
26
Velasquez was fined $5,000 and sentenced to five years probation.
The District Court of New Jersey found that "[flrom all accounts,
[Velasquez] led an exemplary life prior to the incident in 1980, and he
surely has led an exemplary life since then. '2 7 Nonetheless, due to
legislation enacted in 1996, Velasquez is subject to removal from the
United States because his prior convictions amount to "aggravated
felonies" under current immigration law, 2 8 and neither an
Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has

Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Velazquez. 375 F. Supp. 2d at 664-65.
20.
Id. at 665.
21.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
Id.
24.
25.
Velazquez, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
The Velasquez court does not actually discuss the merits of Velasquez'
28.
removal, because the issue before the court was the legality of his detention pending
his removal proceeding. Id. ("Petitioner now challenges the application of the
mandatory detention provision to him."). However, because his convictions fall under
the "aggravated felony" definition in Section 101(43)(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, he was subject to mandatory deportation. Morawetz, supra note 5, at
1940-41.
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discretionary power to allow him to stay in the country. 29 Moreover,
30
no Article III court has jurisdiction to review his deportation.
Although certain criminal convictions subjected foreign nationals
to deportation before the legislative changes of 1996 were enacted,
the potential harshness of the statutory scheme was mitigated by two
factors: the narrower range of crimes that rendered a foreign national
deportable, and the availability of a discretionary waiver of
deportation. 31 When a resident foreign national was found deportable
by virtue of a criminal conviction, that individual could apply for a
discretionary waiver under Section 212(c), 32 unless the foreign
national had been convicted of at least one of several enumerated
33
serious crimes and had served at least five years in prison.
Catalina Arreguin de Rodriguez is a non-citizen resident who
benefited from the prior availability of the 212(c) waiver. 34 Her case,
juxtaposed with Velasquez, illustrates why the discretionary waiver is
vital for a statutory scheme that calls for the deportation of foreign
nationals who have any of a wide range of criminal convictions. Only
four years before Velasquez was decided, the Board of Immigration
Appeals granted de Rodriguez, a 41-year old mother of five U.S.
citizens, a discretionary waiver, because it found that unusual and
outstanding equities countervailed the seriousness of the underlying
criminal conviction that rendered her deportable.3 5 In 1993, de
Rodriguez was convicted of importing 78.45 kilograms of marijuana
from Mexico. 3 6 The Board "balance[d] the adverse factors evidencing
[de Rodriguez's] undesirability as a permanent resident with the
social and humane considerations presented in her behalf to
determine whether the granting of Section 212(c) relief appear[ed] to
be in the best interests of this country. ''37 In its decision, the Board

29.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)
(2000) ('The Attorney General may cancel removal . . . if the alien has not been
convicted of any aggravated felony.").
30.
See Immigration and Nationality Act §242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)
("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review
any final order or removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense covered in section . . . 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)."). INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) states that any alien convicted of an aggravated felony at any time is
deportable.
31.
See Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Section 212(c)
of the [INA] allows the attorney general to grant discretionary relief from
deportation .. "); Morawetz, supra note 5, at 1939-40 ("[The most publicized aspect of
the new laws is their Alice-in-Wonderland-like definition of the term "aggravated
felony.").
32.
See infra Part I.C. and accompanying notes for a more detailed discussion
of the 212(c) waiver.
33.
Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1371.
34.
In re de Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1995).
35.
Id. at 40-43.
36.
Id. at 39.
37.
Id.
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cited the following as favorable factors: (1) de Rodriguez had no other
criminal convictions; (2) she accepted responsibility and expressed
remorse for her crime; (3) she had resided in the United States for a
total of twenty-five years, and her presence in the United States was
legal for all but five of those years; (4) she had five resident children
in the United States, two of whom were still minors; (5) she had
"advanced her meager education by voluntarily pursuing GED
studies" while in prison; (6) she had no prison infractions; (7) a letter
was submitted to the Board stating that she would be offered fulltime employment upon her release; (8) she had supported herself and
her children during most of her twenty-five years in this country; and
(9) she had resorted to welfare for only two short time periods. 38 The
adverse factors cited by the Board included the gravity of de
Rodriguez' drug offense and an apprehension report which showed
that she had been arrested on suspicion of alien smuggling for gain
39
for which prosecution was declined.
Had the INS addressed Velasquez's criminal convictions while
the Section 212(c) waiver was still available, there is little doubt that
the immigration court would have found that, as in the case of
Catalina de Rodriguez, unusual and outstanding equities called for
relief from deportation for Velasquez. 40 Unfortunately for him, the
INS paid Velasquez no attention until he left the country and
reentered U.S. borders again in 1998-two years after Congress
eliminated the 212(c) waiver. Thus, had his mother's hip surgery
occurred in 1995, instead of 1998, Velasquez also would have been a
likely beneficiary of the discretionary waiver.
There is little momentum for public attention to the inequities
suffered by foreign nationals with criminal convictions amid daily
color-coded terrorist warnings and doomsday-happy media accounts
41
of plots threatening Americans beyond and within our borders.

38.
Id. at 40-41.
39.
In re Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 42.
40.
The record in Velasquez's case demonstrates that he had at least as many
social and humane factors in his favor, and fewer adverse ones. See discussion supra
notes 9-27 and accompanying text. For example, Velazquez would have the following
equities in his favor: (1) he had no other criminal convictions, (2) he had two siblings, a
wife, and three children who are all U.S. citizens, (3) he resided in the United States
continuously and legally for nearly forty years, (4) he owned a home with his wife in
the United States, and he also owned a business in the United States for many years,
(5) he neither received nor anticipated compensation for his crime, and (7) he
successfully completed his probation and "led an exemplary life" prior to and after his
crime. Velazquez v. Reno, 37 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (D.N.J. 1999).
41.
See Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, Bin Laden Calls Iraqis to Arms; On

Tape, Al Qaeda Leader Urges Suicide Attacks Against U.S., WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2003,
at Al (referring to a "surge in intelligence indicating that al Qaeda may be planning
attacks with poisons, viruses or radiological 'dirty bombs' domestically and overseas");

Andrew Miga, Feds Issue Terror Warning, Country on Alert for Attack Anniversary,
BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 10, 2002, at 07 ("[T]he Homeland Security Office's official
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Thus, foreign nationals who come under the umbrella of the
automatic deportation scheme for even minor criminal convictions are
in an increasingly perilous position. While the rules at issue have
been on the books since 1996, enforcement has sharply increased
since 2001.42 It may be tempting to conclude that the hardships
caused by this deportation regime are temporary, then, and will blow
over as soon as the hype about terrorism diminishes-that this is just
another September 11 issue.
However, the present criminalization of immigration is part of a
long-standing pattern in the history of this so-called "melting pot,"
and thus has implications beyond the specific problems arising in the
post-September 11 context. 43 This pattern can be traced back to the
Federalists' characterization of Thomas Jefferson's Republican party
as "French Revolutionaries and unwashed Irish immigrants," the
internment of Japanese immigrants during the World War II, and44the
deportation of suspected Communists during the McCarthy era. If
the lessons of history are any guide, a meaningful change in
immigration policy is unlikely in the near future, 4 5 despite some very
persuasive arguments for a major revision of this area of law. 46 The

terrorist threat level remains at yellow."); Robert Schlesinger & Anne Kornblut, U.S.
Sure Terroristswill Strike, Uncertain Where or When, BOSTON GLOBE, May 22, 2002, at
A28 ('CTerrorist groups are certain to obtain nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
and use them against the United States."); Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, Detainee
Called Key Al Qaeda Figure in Southeast Asia, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2002, at A30
("Information provided ... led the government to elevate the terrorist threat status
Tuesday to 'Orange,' reflecting a 'high' chance of attack on U.S. interests."); Cam
Simpson, US Terror Alert Lowered a Notch; Americans Told to Keep Guard Up Amid
Iraqi Crisis, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2003, at 8 (referring to the code orange terror alert:
"officials had 'specific intelligence' indicating a high risk of Al Qaeda attacks. They also
said chemical, biological or radioactive weapons could be used.").
See Tom Mccann, Lawyers Scramble to Help Immigrants Caught in the Net
42.
of Tighter Enforcement, CHI. LAw., Aug. 2003, at 8 (quoting immigration attorney
Royal F. Berg: "The problem is the government is adopting an absolute zero-tolerance
policy.... The government is not showing any hesitance to deport people with things
like shoplifting arrests, small-time drug charges and other minor offences that might
appear as aggravated felonies.").
See generally Michael Maggio, The Lawyer and Our History: Practicing
43.
Immigration Law has Rarely Been More Important to the Country, LEGAL TIMES, July
28, 2003, at 34.
Id.
44.
Legislation which would mitigate some of the harsh and arbitrary
45.
consequences of the law governing the deportation of aliens with criminal convictions
was introduced in the House of Representatives in January 2003, but no action has
been taken regarding the bill since it was referred to the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. Unity, Security, Accountability, and Family
Act of 2003, H.R. 440, 108th Cong. (2003) ("The purpose of this Act is to create a
system that recognizes and reflects the enormous contribution immigrants make to our
work force and economy... ").
46.
See generally Coonan, supra note 7; Ellis M. Johnston, Once a Criminal,
Always a Criminal? Unconstitutional Presumptions for Mandatory Detention of
Criminal Aliens, 89 GEO. L.J. 2593 (2001); Morawetz, supra note 5; Robert Pauw,
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pattern of arbitrarily punishing selected groups of foreign nationals
and immigrants generally during times of national crises will
probably not end when the "war on terror" is over; it will undoubtedly
emerge again at a later date. For this reason, it is imperative that the
laws, as written, be less amenable to sweeping application and widely
variable enforcement policies.
The government has recently announced several new
enforcement programs designed to ensure that foreign nationals
deportable under the mandatory scheme do not slip through the
government's fingers due to administrative oversight. For example,
the Department of Homeland Security recently announced two
enforcement initiatives, "Operation Tarmac" and "Operation
Predator, '47 and new legislation was introduced in the House of
Representatives in July 2003 to enlist local police in the national
effort to ensure the apprehension and removal of foreign nationals
deportable on criminal grounds. 48 Immigration officers at U.S. ports
of entry have been given new expansive access to criminal databases
in the last year, enabling those officers to discover deportable foreign
49
nationals who have left the country temporarily upon reentry.
While both of these enforcement measures provide the INS with
potentially useful tools for ensuring national security, they also
create the possibility of unchecked abuse and have already resulted
in the deportation of numerous unsuspecting immigrants on the basis
of decades-old misdemeanor convictions.5 0 Though ridding the
country of any criminal element attributable to a foreign source may
be a laudable goal in the abstract, aside from any national security
rationale, that policy overlooks several relevant considerations. These
considerations include: (1) the impact the policy has on citizen family
members and employers; (2) the fact that many deportable foreign
nationals have resided in the United States since infancy, and thus it
is arguably poor policy to loose home-grown convicted criminals in a
foreign country, assuming they are actually dangerous enough to

Plenary Power: An Outdated Doctrine that Should not Limit IIRIRA Reform, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1095 (2002); Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as
Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1143 (2002).

47.
"Operation Tarmac" targets non-citizen airport employees with past
criminal convictions. See Colleen Mastony, Couple Face Deportation, Leaving Kids;
Immigrants Built American Life, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 25, 2003, at 1. "Operation
Predator" targets non-citizens with past sex offense convictions. Of the Department's
goal to deport all aliens with qualifying criminal convictions, special agent Leigh
Winchell said "[w]e're focusing first on the worst of the worst and taking strategically
one step at a time from there." Chris McGann, FederalAgency Targets Sex Predators;
Homeland Security Brings Immigration Law to Bear in New Initiative, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July 10, 2003.

48.
Julia Malone, Norwood Seeks Use of Police to Deport; Convicted Illegals
Slip through Cracks, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, July 10, 2003, at 3A.
49.
Mccann, supra note 42, at 8.
50.
Id.
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justify deportation; and (3) the extent to which the policy implies the
criminal justice system is such a failure that criminals who have
served sentences imposed upon them by U.S. courts should be
expelled, whenever possible, from our borders immediately
thereafter, in order to protect the public. 5 1 Apart from these policy
and fairness considerations, the current scheme of mandatory
deportation of foreign nationals with criminal convictions conflicts
with requirements of international human rights law and falls
outside the spirit of Constitutional guarantees of due process. These
latter two concerns form the primary focus of this note.
Part I of this Note will trace the creation and expansion of the
"aggravated felony" ground of exclusion and deportation, and it will
explore the evolution of Section 212(c) and its replacement, Section
240A, as they have applied to foreign nationals deported on
aggravated felony grounds. Part II of the Note will analyze how the
combined effect of the changes to Section 212(c), the enactment of
240A in its place, and the expansion of the "aggravated felony"
category raise significant legal and policy concerns in both the
international and domestic arenas. Finally, Part III will posit some
recommendations, modeled in part on comparable provisions
governing deportation of criminal foreign nationals in the United
Kingdom, for legislative alterations of the existing law that would
provide for a more equitable treatment of criminal foreign nationals
without compromising the purpose of Congress' most recent changes
in immigration law, promotion of public safety and national security.

II. HISTORY

A. Overview of Recent Changes to Immigration Law Concerning
Status of CriminalForeignNationals
Over the past decade, Congress has enacted a series of
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), resulting
in a convoluted landscape of deportation and exclusion provisions,
many of which have left even the most sophisticated immigration
lawyers and their clients confused and exasperated. 52 Adding to the

51.
See, e.g., Morawetz, supra note 5, at 1950-54 (discussing the imposition of
permanent family separation as unduly harmful to family members of deportees);
Americas Review World of Information, Jamaica-Review, Sept. 29, 2003, 2003 WL
65466471, at 1 (stating that many analysts attribute the crisis of rising crime rates in
Jamaica to criminals deported from the United States).
52.
The loose and expanding definition of "aggravated felony" has been dubbed
"a practitioner's nightmare," and the effective dates of provisions "equally baffling."
Coonan, supra note 7, at 216, n.99 (quoting Craig H. Feldman, Note, The Immigration
Act of 1990: Congress Continues to Aggravate the Criminal Alien, 17 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 201, 230 (1993)).
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confusion, in the last year the INS has been dissolved and
reorganized as three different bodies under the Department of
Homeland Security. The enforcement arm of the new organization,
which is responsible for removal of deportable foreign nationals, is
5 3
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The creation and expansion of the category of "aggravated
felony" as a ground for which a foreign national can be deported or
excluded has, in particular, undergone an array of dramatic
changes. 5 4 At the same time, the provision by which a foreign
national convicted of a crime may seek relief from deportation or
exclusion has seen a great deal of transformation in recent legislative
history. 55 The changes in these two areas of immigration law, the
concurrent expansion of the "aggravated felony" definition and
contraction of the availability of discretionary relief from deportation
and exclusion, has resulted in the unchecked removal of some foreign
nationals whose crimes were, ironically, neither aggravated nor
felonious.5 6 Because of the retroactive application of Congress' most
recent definition of "aggravated felony," cases have emerged in which
legal permanent residents who have been in the United States for
nearly all their lives are being deported to countries of which they
have no memory and to which they have no familial or linguistic ties,
due only to the fact that years before they committed a crime as
57
trivial as pulling the hair of another person.
B. Expansion of the Meaning of 'AggravatedFelony"
The inception of the "aggravated felony" category in the
immigration context occurred in 1988, when Congress incorporated

53.
Mccann, supra note 42.
54.
Coonan, supra note 7, at 590; see Ishola, supra note 8, at 8; O'Rourke, supra
note 8, at 354. See also discussion infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the creation of the "aggravated felony" category in the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) and its expansion by the Immigration Act of 1990, the
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (INTCA), the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).
55.
See discussion infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the history of the availability of waiver authorized by Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(c) and its replacement, cancellation of removal, found in Immigration and
Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000).
56.
Coonan, supra note 7, at 609.
57.
Morawetz, supra note 5, at 1943 (discussing the case of Mary Ann Gehris,
whose conviction for battery fits within the definition of "aggravated felony" as a crime
of violence, despite the fact that her conviction was based simply on her pulling the
hair of another woman, for which she received a one-year suspended sentence); see also
Coonan, supra note 7, at 591; Fine, supra note 8, at 492; O'Rourke, supra note 8, at
355; Vincent J. Schodolski, Immigrants Face Deportation for Old Crimes Under New
Laws; Reform Snares Legal Residents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 1997, at 3.
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the term into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA).58 At that time, the
definition of "aggravated felony" included only murder, drug
trafficking, firearms trafficking, or the conspiracy to commit any of
these offenses.5 9 Under the ADAA, classification as an aggravated
felon in the immigration context had several implications for a
resident foreign national: (1) he would be presumed to be deportable,
(2) he would be ineligible for voluntary departure-thus the only
available form of relief from deportation was the 212(c) discretionary
the
waiver, and (3) he would be prohibited from applying to reenter
60
United States within the ten years following his deportation.
The ADAA reflected "a Congressional effort to rid the nation of its
least desirable aliens." 61 However, Congress was clearly unsatisfied
with the breadth (or lack thereof) of the new category of undesirables,
and so amended the definition of "aggravated felony" in the
Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), again in the Immigration and
Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (INCTA), and yet again
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).62 Despite the fact that AEDPA and its predecessors had
already added numerous crimes to the definition of "aggravated
felony," greatly expanding the category, Congress decided to go at it
one more time in 1996 with the enactment of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), in which it
stretched the Section 101(a)(43) definition of "aggravated felony" to its
present form. 6 3 The scope of the definition as it has stood since 1996

hardly resembles the category of the 'least desirables" described in
1988.
In order to appreciate how extraordinarily broad the INA
definition of "aggravated felony" is, it is necessary to review the
laundry list of criminal offenses that are included in the category.
Under INA Section 101(a)(43), the definition of "aggravated felony,"
for immigration purposes, covers all of the following self-explanatory
offenses: murder, rape, sexual abuse of minor, drug trafficking and
related crimes, trafficking of firearms or explosives, kidnapping for
ransom, and child pornography offenses. 64 More problematic or
controversial are the offenses that qualify as "aggravated felonies"
depending upon either the sentence available or the sentence actually
imposed for the offense. These include any theft or burglary offense
for which the punishment is at least one year of imprisonment; RICO
offenses or gambling offenses for which a term of imprisonment of one

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
Id.
See Coonan, supranote 7, at 593.
O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 354.
See Coonan, supranote 7, at 592-605.
See id.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000).
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year or more may be imposed; forgery or other document fraud for
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; commercial
bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking of vehicles with altered
identification numbers for which a prison sentence of at least one
year has been imposed; obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation
of perjury, or bribery of a witness for which a sentence of at least one
year has been imposed; failure to appear to answer a felony charge for
which the underlying offense may result in a sentence of two years or
more; failure to appear for service of sentence if the underlying
offense is one for which a term of imprisonment of five years or more
may be imposed. 65 Other crimes included in the definition are: money
laundering for which amounts exceed $10,000; fraud or tax evasion
for which the loss to victim or government exceeds $10,000; alien
smuggling or transport; illegal entry or reentry into the US after
deportation on grounds of aggravated felony conviction; any crime of
violence; crimes related to prostitution; and national security related
66
offenses.
There are four features of the definition of "aggravated felony"
and its application that are particularly relevant in an analysis of the
statute's fairness, utility, and inconsistency with international law.
First, highly significant to the application of the statute is the fact
that the definition applies retroactively to crimes for which
convictions were entered at any time, both before and after the
enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA. 67 Second, adding to the weight of
the definition's impact, if a foreign national's conviction falls within
the parameters of Section 101(a)(43), it is irrelevant whether that
crime is actually classified as "aggravated" or as a "felony" under
68
state or federal criminal law.
In United States v. Urias-Escobar, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that "[w]hatever the wisdom of Congress' decision to
alter the historic one-year line between a misdemeanor and a felony,
the statute is unambiguous in its sweep. ' 69 In that case, the Court
determined that Urias-Escobar's state conviction for misdemeanor
assault with bodily injury, for which he received a one-year
suspended sentence, constituted an aggravated felony under Section
101(a)(43)(IF) as a crime of violence. A third aspect of the "aggravated
felony" definition is that deportation for several crimes within the
category hinges on the term of imprisonment that could be sentenced,
not upon the term of imprisonment that is actually ordered by the
sentencing judge. 70 Hence, a foreign national can be deported even

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 168.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000).
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when a judge deemed the offense so minor as to warrant no jail time
at all. 7 1 Finally, the highly inclusive nature of two categories of
offenses listed as "aggravated felonies" renders the definition even
broader than it may first appear.7 2 The "crime of violence" component
of the definition has proved particularly inclusive of a wide variety of
criminal offenses as applied by the courts, drawing under its label
DUI offenses, 73 simple assault, 74 and acts of self-defense by women
who are victims of domestic violence. 75 The "drug-trafficking crimes"
referred to in Section 101(43)(a)(C) have also included criminal
offenses that are traditionally regarded as not very serious. For
example, two or more simple possession of marijuana offenses
constitute an "aggravated felony" under this provision. 76 In July of
2003, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an immigrant
who had entered a guilty plea and agreed to a term of probation for
cocaine possession as a first-time offender, in exchange for having his
adjudication of guilt withheld, had been convicted of an "aggravated
77
felony" for purposes of Section 101(a)(43).
Recognition of some other changes that AEDPA and IIRIRA
made to the process of deportation is also pertinent to the
comprehension of why the effects of the expansion of the "aggravated
felony" definition conflict with international law and notions of due
process. The changes made by those legislative acts call for
mandatory deportation of any foreign national convicted of an
aggravated felony without any possibility for meaningful judicial
review; 78 the only issue a court may review is whether or not the
crime for which a foreign national is convicted is reached by the
definition in 101(a)(43). 7 9 Additionally, mandatory detention of those
80
foreign nationals pending their deportation hearings is required.
The deportation and detention provisions for foreign nationals with
aggravated felony convictions operate without regard to the factual
circumstances or gravity of the underlying offenses.8 1 Robert Pauw

71.
Urias-Escobar,281 F.3d at 166-67.
72.
See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
73.
See, e.g., Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001). But see
United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 927-28 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
DUI does not constitute a "crime of violence" under Section 101(a)(43)(F)).
See Urias-Escobar,281 F.3d at 167-68 ("Whatever the wisdom of Congress's
74.
decision to alter the historic one-year line between a misdemeanor and a felony, the
statute is unambiguous in its sweep.").
75.
See Cecilia M. Espinoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for
Battered Immigrants Lost in the Intersection, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 215-16 (1999).
76.
See Pauw, supra note 46, at 1098.
Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 574 (7th Cir. 2003).
77.
Pauw, supranote 46, at 1095.
78.
79.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2000).
See also infra, note 104; Pauw, supra note 46, at 1095.
80.
Pauw, supranote 46, at 1095.
81.
Id.
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identifies one of the critical problems of what he dubs these
"draconian" measures: "[t]here is no sense of proportion, no possibility
for balancing social and humane factors against the seriousness of the
underlying offense."8 2 As stated above, prior to 1996, a discretionary
waiver of deportation for criminal foreign nationals was available in
212(c) to provide relief for foreign nationals whose equities
outweighed their criminal conduct.8 3 IIRIRA eliminated the 212(c)
waiver, replacing it with the provision of Section 240A cancellation of
removal, which is absolutely unavailable to foreign nationals
84
convicted of aggravated felonies.
C. Elimination of the 212(c) Waiver and the Introductionof its
Replacement, 240A Cancellationof Removal
Well before the introduction of "aggravated felony" into the
statutory scheme, Congress provided discretionary relief for a
deportable criminal alien in order to alleviate the hardship to
resident family members of the foreign national, in limited
circumstances.8 5 That relief was supplied by INA Section 212(c). 8 6 As
one commentator has noted, "few legal subjects are as complicated as
the history of the so-called Section 212(c) waiver. 87 This Note will
focus on Section 212(c)'s limited historical relationship with the
"aggravated felony," except where it is necessary to look briefly at the
equal protection issues that arose in relation to the section before the
introduction of the aggravated felony category.
On its face, Section 212(c) originally provided relief only to
"[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation,

82.
Id.
83.
See supranotes 31-33 and accompanying text.
84.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.L. 104208, Div. C, Title III, § 304, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-597.
85.
See Sonia Chen, The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996: Another Congressional Hurdle for the Courts, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 169, 187 (2000).

86.
Before Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was replaced
with Section 240A in 1996, Section 212(c) stated:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are
returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may
be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the
provisions of paragraphs (1) through (25) and paragraph (3) of subsection (a).
Nothing contained in this subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney
General to exercise the discretion rested in him under Section 211(b).

8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).
87.
Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere: The Strange Quality of Supreme
Court Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 428 (2002).
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and who are returning" to the United States. 88 In other words, the
remedy in Section 212(c) appeared to be available only to excludable,
and not deportable, aliens. 8 9 However, in 1976, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found Section 212(c) violated a foreign national's
equal protection rights in so far as it arbitrarily provided a remedy
for legal permanent residents who had temporarily left the country
but provided no such remedy for those who had not left the country at
all. 90 Ultimately, the Board of Immigration Appeals and other circuits
followed the Second Circuit, and Section 212(c) was thereafter read to
apply in both exclusion and deportation proceedings. 91
Since the Second Circuit initiated application of Section 212(c) to
both deportable and excludable foreign nationals, the statute
underwent a facelift, only to be ultimately repealed and replaced with
a new remedial provision, cancellation of removal, found in INA
Section 240A. 92 The most recent version of Section 212(c), as
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), is being applied to exclusion and deportation
proceedings initiated prior to April 1, 1997, and Section 240A is being
applied to proceedings initiated on or after that date. 93 Facially, the
AEDPA-amended Section 212(c) offers relief only to foreign nationals
convicted of aggravated felonies who are in exclusion, not deportation,
proceedings, and Section 240A completely bars relief for all foreign
nationals convicted of aggravated felonies. 94 While the AEDPA
version of Section 212(c) would seem constitutionally defective for the
same reasons the Second Circuit found its predecessor violated the
Equal Protection Clause in 1976, most courts, including the Second
Circuit, have held that no equal protection violation exists in this

88.
See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1976).
89.
Elwin Griffith, The Road Between the Section 212(c) Waiver and
Cancellationof Removal Under Section 240A of the Immigration and NationalityActThe Impact of the 1996 Reform Legislation, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 66 (1997). See also
Tapia-Acuna v. INS 640 F.2d 223, 224 (9th Cir. 1981); Francis, 532 F.2d at 271.
90.
Francis, 532 F.2d at 273.
91.
Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 784 n.495 (1997) (citing
Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 29-30 (B.I.A.1976)); Tapia-Acuna, 640 F.2d at 224.
92.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c) (as amended by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)), in the former 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1996); Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A (enacted by Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) to replace
§ 212(c)), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996). IIRIRA was enacted a few months after AEDPA.
See In re Fuentes-Campos, 21 I. & N. Dec. 905, 905-06 (B.I.A. 1997). See also Patricia
Flynn & Judith Patterson, Five Years Later: Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53 BAYLOR L.
REV. 557, 580 n.144 (2001).
93.
Maria Baldini-Potermin, Defending Non-Citizens in Minnesota Courts: A
PracticalGuide to Immigration Law and Client Cases, 17 LAW & INEQ. 567, 658 (1999).
94.
Fuentos-Campos,21 I. & N. at 913.
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version of the statute. 95 However, a recently released Ninth Circuit
opinion challenges those decisions. 96 In any case, whatever the
distinction between exclusion and deportation for purposes of Section
212(c), only those whose removal proceedings were initiated prior to
April 1, 1997 may benefit at present. Once again, it would seem that
the timing of Velasquez's mother's hip surgery could have made all
97
the difference.
As previously noted, the relationship between the aggravated
felony ground for exclusion and deportation with the Section 212(c)
waiver has been a limited one. 98 Two years after it introduced the
category of "aggravated felony" in the ADAA, Congress enacted the
Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), amending the existing Section
212(c) waiver such that any "alien who has been convicted of an
aggravated felony and has served a term of imprisonment for at least
five years" was barred from relief under Section 212(c). 99 In April of
1996, Congress amended the 212(c) waiver once more when it enacted
AEDPA, this time legislating that no relief would be available to "an
alien who is deportable by reason of having committed" any
aggravated felony, among other crimes. 10 0 This is the version of
Section 212(c) that applies in removal proceedings initiated prior to
April 1, 1997.101
With the enactment of IIRIRA, Congress simultaneously
expanded the definition of "aggravated felony," totally repealed
Section 212(c), and replaced the waiver relief with a new remedy,
cancellation of removal, found in Section 240A. 102 The new remedy
acts as an absolute bar to relief for any foreign national whose
03
conviction meets the statutory definition of "aggravated felony."'
Prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, approximately half of all
applications for Section 212(c) waivers were granted to long-time
permanent residents of the United States. 0 4 Because no other relief

95.
See Laguerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1153 (2000); Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greens, 190 F.3d 1135, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1041 (2000); DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 183-84 (3d Cir.
1999); Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1999); Almon v.
Reno, 192 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999); Asad v. Reno, 242 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 2001).
96.
See generally Servin-Espinoza v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2002).
97.
Velasquez's removal proceeding was initiated in 1998. See discussion supra
notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
98.
See supra notes 31-33, 60, 85-89 and accompanying text.
99.
See Trina Realmuto, St. Cyr's Impact on Pre-IIRIRA Bars to § 212(c)
Eligibility, IMMIGR. CURRENT AWARENESS NEWS., Aug. 22, 2002, at 8.
100.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c) (as amended by AEDPA), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed as of Sept. 1996).
101.
See discussion supranotes 31-33 and accompanying text.
102.
8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996).
103.
Id.
104.
Michelle Slayton, Comment, Interim Decision No. 3333: The Brief, Casual,
and Innocent Conundrum, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1029, 1069 (1999).

1636

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:1619

is available under the immigration code, all foreign nationals
have been convicted of aggravated felonies, a category which
includes a wide array of crimes ranging from the dangerous
violent to "nonviolent crimes and even victimless habits,"'10 5
essentially automatically deported.

who
now
and
are

III. ANALYSIS
A. Mandatory Deportationof CriminalForeignNationals Poses
Potential Conflicts with InternationalHuman Rights Law
The mandatory deportation ofef foreign nationals who are
convicted of crimes that fall under the statutory definition of
"aggravated felony" presents conflicts with at least three important
bodies of international law: the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees (hereinafter Refugee Protocol), to which the United States
acceded in 1968;106 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter
Convention against Torture), which the United States ratified in
1994;107 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter
Universal Declaration),10 8 which, though not a treaty, is increasingly
regarded as imposing some legal obligations upon members of the
U.N. Charter.' 0 9 Barring narrow exceptions discussed below, any
statute that mandates the deportation of foreign nationals without
any sort of judicial or discretionary review runs contrary to these
instruments of international human rights law.
1. The Refugee Protocol
The United States acceded to the Refugee Protocol in 1968.110
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[tihe Protocol bound parties
to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees...
with respect to 'refugees' as defined in Article 1.12 of the Protocol.""'

105.
Johnston, supra note 46, at 2599.
106.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
107.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
against Torture].
108.
Univeral Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
109.
See Pauw, supra note 46, at 1117 n.94.
110.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984).
111.
Id. The Court notes that the United States was not a signatory of the
Convention itself. Id. at 416 n.9.

2003]

DEPORTA TION OF AGGRA VA TED FELONS'

1637

Pertinent to the mandatory deportation of foreign nationals convicted
of crimes qualifying as aggravated felonies under Section 101(a)(43)
are Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of
112
Refugees (hereinafter the Refugee Convention).
Article 32.1 provides that "Contracting States shall not expel a
refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national
security or public order." 113 Because Section 101(a)(43) has such a
broad reach, many crimes that qualify for deportation under it do114not
It
rise to the level of a threat to national security or public order.
would be absurd to argue that Jose Velasquez, in casually identifying
another man at a party as someone who might sell cocaine, was
deportable on grounds of national security. Similarly, a person who is
convicted of shoplifting and receives a suspended sentence of 365
days-who is likewise subject to automatic deportation-does not
pose a threat to national security; the court that imposed the
suspended sentence has determined as 115much in deciding
incarceration of the offender was unnecessary.
As to whether aggravated felons pose a threat to public order, it
may be a stretch to say that Jose Velasquez posed a threat to public
order at the time he was convicted of his crime; it is patently absurd
to posit that nearly two decades later he poses a threat to public
order, when he has not only maintained a clean record throughout
that span of time, but has also retained gainful employment, raised a
family, owned a home and led an otherwise exemplary life since the
time of his conviction."l 6 Thus, INA Section 101(43)(a), which defines
aggravated felonies, in combination with INA Section 237(a)(2)(iii),
which requires deportation of aggravated felons, is in direct conflict
with the Refugee Protocol when the aggravated felon meets the
definition of "refugee" 117 and when his or her conviction does not rise
to grounds of national security or public order for deportation
118
purposes.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
112.
150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
113.
Id.
See discussion supra notes 4-7, 57, 65-77 and accompanying text.
114.
See Pauw, supra note 46, at 1100.
115.
116.
Velasquez v. Reno, 37 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664-65 (D.N.J. 1999).
Article 1.2 of the Protocol defines a refugee as an individual who:
117.
[0] wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.

Refugee Protocol, supra note 106, at 6225.
118.
Refugee Convention, supra note 112, at 174.
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Article 32.2 of the Refugee Convention guarantees a refugee who
is expelled within the parameters of 32.1 a right of due process:
The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to
and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a
person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.11 9

This provision is also violated by the JIRIRA-amended deportation
scheme when the deportee meets the "refugee" definition. Because the
statute unconditionally mandates deportation of foreign nationals
convicted of aggravated felonies, there is no meaningful hearing on
the deportation order itself. 120 The statute explicitly bars judicial
review of deportation orders for aggravated felons. 121 Though several
circuit courts have held that federal courts retain appellate review as
to whether the conviction triggering deportation meets the statutory
definition of "aggravated felony, ' 122 there is no point at which a
foreign national deported under Section 237(a)(2) is entitled to
administrative or judicial review on the question of whether the
deportee poses a threat to national security or public order. 123
Article 33.1 of the Refugee Convention 124 prohibits the deportation
or return of a refugee "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion."'1 25 Article 33.2 carves out an exception to the 33.1
ban on refoulement for a refugee for whom "there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in
which he is in, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country."'1 26 The effect of Article 33 is to heighten the standard by
which a refugee who would face death or imprisonment in his home
country may be deported, 12 7 providing only two narrow exceptions. The

119.
Id.
120.
The absence of a meaningful hearing does not comport with the requisite
"decision reached in accordance with due process of law" in Article 32.2. Id.

121.
122.

INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
Julie Ann Rah, The Removal of Aliens Who Drink and Drive: Felony DWI as

a "Crime of Violence" under 18 U.S.C. §16(b), 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2109, 2124 n.118
(2002).
123.
See discussion infra notes 181-98 (discussing a case, later overruled, where
a district court found that a limited hearing was required in certain circumstances).
124.
This provision is often referred to as the "non-refoulement" provision.
125.
Refugee Convention, supra note 112, at 176.
126.
Id. (emphasis added).
127.
The definition of "refugee" merely requires that the alien have a "wellfounded fear" that he would face persecution. Id. at 152. To meet Article 33, a showing
that the alien would be killed or imprisoned is required. Id. The strong mandate
against refoulement in Article 33 reflects the Convention signatories' intent to prevent
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first exception, attaching to a refugee who poses a danger to national
security has been construed narrowly, 128 such that it has been 'largely
subsumed" by the second exception. 129 The second exception has two
requirements: (1) that the refugee have committed a "particularly
serious crime", and (2) that the refugee pose a danger to his
130
community.
Precisely what constitutes a "particularly serious crime," and
when a danger to the community is present, are difficult to nail down,
but some themes emerge from a review of various international
interpretations of Article 33. Courts typically employ principles of
proportionality in weighing the underlying offense and the severity of
the consequences of refoulement, examine the underlying facts of the
criminal offense, consider patterns of criminal behavior, and
contemplate alternative means of ensuring safety of the
community. 13 1 Despite the weight of international interpretation,
however, the United States has, since the enactment of AEDPA and
IIRIRA, effectively interpreted the "particularly serious crime"
132
category to be coextensive with that of "aggravated felony."'
INA Section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) addresses the meaning of
"particularly serious crimes" for purposes of Article 33.133 It states
that "an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony ...for
which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of
imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have
committed a particularly serious crime" in the context of
refoulement. 134 That provision further states that "[t]he previous
sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General from determining
that, notwithstanding the length of the sentence imposed, an alien
has been convicted of a serious crime. '135 In March 2002, the
Attorney General directed the BIA to refer a case to him in which he
could address, for the first time, what was meant by Section

a recurrence of the events that had transpired in the Holocaust era, in which many
European Jewish refugees were returned to their nations of origin only to face death or
imprisonment. Kathleen M. Keller, A Comparative and InternationalLaw Perspective
on the United States (Non) Compliance with its Duty of Non-refoulement, 2 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 183, 183 (1999).
128.

(1989).
129.
130.
131.
132.

See

GUNNEL STENBERG,

NON-EXPULSION

AND NON-REFOULEMENT
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Keller, supra note 127, at 188.
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
Gwendolyn M. Holinka, Comment, Q-T-M-T: The Denial of Humanitarian

Relieffor Aggravated Felons, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV 405, 407 (1999).

133.
(2000).
134.
135.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(b)(ii)
Id.
Id.
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241(b)(3)(B)(ii). 136 The Attorney General criticized the BIA's prior
interpretation of that section:
Prior to today, the Attorney General has had no occasion to consider
which aggravated felonies might amount to "particularly serious
crimes" where the prison sentence imposed upon conviction is less than
five years. Operating in this void, the BIA has seen fit to employ a caseby-case approach, applying an individualized, and often haphazard,
assessment as to the "seriousness" of an alien defendant's crime. Not
surprisingly, this methodology has led to results that are both
inconsistent and, as plainly evident here, illogical. 1 3 7

Setting aside the rather troubling fact that the Attorney General
is both responsible for interpreting the scope of his own power and
the Congressional intent behind the statute he is charged with
executing, it is certainly noteworthy that the Attorney General deems
a case-by-case approach that contemplates the seriousness of an
underlying offense as "illogical." That approach is, as previously
stated, one endorsed by many of the member states of the Refugee
Convention, 138 and it is an important part of the approach
recommended by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees'
guidelines. 139 The Attorney General goes on to hold that aggravated
felonies
involving
drug offenses
"presumptively constitute
'particularly serious crimes.' ' 140 The Attorney General limits his
analysis to drug offenses (the offenses at issue in the case) and does
not address any other offenses that fall under the "aggravated felony"
category, but he emphasizes that Section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) does not
mean that aggravated felonies for which sentences of less than five
years were imposed are entitled to any presumption that such
14 1
offenses are not particularly serious crimes.
The duty of non-refoulement imposed on member states in
Article 33 is a particularly serious one that arose from the
Convention's recognition of the grave errors many countries,
including the United States, committed in turning Jewish refugees
away from their borders during the Holocaust. 14 2 The effect of the

136.
In re Y-L, 23 I.&N. Dec. 270, 270, 273 (B.I.A. 2002).
137.
Id. at 273. The "illogical" result at hand was that the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) had found that the cocaine-related convictions of the three aliens
discussed in the Attorney General's opinion did not amount to particularly serious
crimes. Id. at 271. The BIA had based its decision on factors such as the aliens'
cooperation with federal investigators in other cases, their limited criminal histories,
and the fact that each received sentences at the low-end of sentencing guideline ranges.
Id. at 272. The BIA also found that the aliens probably faced persecution or torture if
they were returned to their home countries. Id. Thus, the BIA had held the aliens
should not be deported. Id. at 272.
138.
See discussion supra note 132 and accompanying text.
139.
See Keller, supra note 127, at 188-89.
140.
In re Y-L, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 274.
141.
See id. at 273-75.
142.
See supra note 127.
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mandatory deportation provisions for criminal foreign nationals and
the Attorney General's interpretation of "particularly serious crimes"
has drastically reduced the force of Article 33 as it applies to refugees
who would face a serious threat upon their life or liberty upon return
to their home countries. 143 As such, the United States runs a high
risk of violating its duty of non-refoulement in the context of foreign
nationals who have committed crimes the INA deems "aggravated
felonies."
2. The Convention against Torture
The Convention against Torture, ratified by the United States in
1994,144 presents a problem for Section 237(a)(2)(iii) that is similar to
the one raised by the Refugee Convention. Article 3 of the Convention
against Torture states that "[n]o State Party shall expel, return
("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture."1 45 The mandatory deportation of criminal
foreign nationals facially conflicts with Article 3 when a foreign
national who has been convicted of an aggravated felony would be
subject to torture in her country of origin. 146 However, in 1998, a
narrow exception to the rule of mandatory deportation was carved out
to bring the United States somewhat closer to conformity with the
Convention.147
There are two important features of Article 3 of the Convention
against Torture that give it greater force than Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention: (1) the language of the provision refers to
"persons" rather than to "refugees," thus an alien seeking to avoid
deportation on the ground that she will be subject to torture in her
nation of origin does not have to show that she will be subject to
persecution due to her membership in a particular social group; and
(2) there are no exceptions to the prohibition on expelling an alien
who would be subject to torture in her home country. 148 Accordingly,
Article 3 absolutely prohibits the deportation of such foreign
nationals, at least in theory, even if the ground for deportation is an
aggravated felony conviction. 149 Despite the facial inconsistency

143.
See Coonan, supra note 7, at 606-07.
144.
Convention against Torture, supra note 107.
145.
Id.
146.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
147.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v).
148.
Andrea Montavon-McKillip, Cat Among Pigeons. The Convention against
Torture, A Precarious Intersection between International Human Rights and U.S.
Immigration Law, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 247, 252 (2002).
149.
Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A SelfExecuting Treaty that Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 533, 540 (1998).
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between the content of U.S. immigration law and the Convention
against Torture, it appears that after a shaky start, Congress and the
INS have decided that aggravated felons are in fact entitled to at
least some relief under Article 3 if they can show that they would risk
torture upon return to their home countries. 150 Nonetheless, there are
some significant limitations to the protection extended to aggravated
felons however.
Before 1998, many immigration judges denied applications for
relief under the Convention against Torture because Congress had
not yet enacted enabling legislation. 151 In 1998, ten years after the
United States signed the Convention and four years after it became a
full member of the treaty, Congress ordered the INS to comply with
the Convention against Torture. 152 The INS promulgated rules
153
208.16-18 in accordance with Congress' order.
While the rules do include relief for aggravated felons, they
provide ostensibly less protection for aggravated felons than Article 3
itself does. 154 By reference of Section 241(b)(3)(ii), Rule 208.16(b)
requires a foreign national who has committed a particularly serious
crime to individually carry the burden of proof that he will "more
likely than not" be subject to torture if he is deported.' 5 5 Further, the
foreign national's deportation is not actually cancelled; it is merely
deferred, and as such, the foreign national can be deported at a later
156
date if the government shows the risk of torture has dissipated.
When the government initiates termination proceedings, the foreign
national can have as little as ten days to prepare to show, under de
novo review, that he is still more likely than not to be tortured upon
return to his home country. 157 An aggravated felon's protection may
also be terminated if the State Department receives "diplomatic
assurances" from the deportee's county of origin that she will not be
tortured. 158 These provisions arguably deal purely with procedure
and thus present no real conflict with Article 3 of the Convention.
Perhaps it can be said that it is simply the case that more liberal
procedures are in place for foreign nationals who have not committed
particularly serious crimes. However, some scholars suggest that the
deferral of removal procedures for foreign nationals who fall under
Section 241(b)(3)(ii) could present an opportunity for the government

150.
See Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003); 8 C.F.R 208.16.
151.
See Montavon-McKillip, supra note 148, at 251.
152.
Kristen B. Rosati, International Human Rights Treaties Can Make a
Difference, 28 HUM. RTS. 14, 14 (Winter 2001).
153.
Id. at 15.
154.
Id. at 16.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Deferral of Removal Under the Convention against Torture, 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.17(f) (2003).
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to harass a foreign national by repeatedly initiating termination
procedures, or could put a foreign national in the dangerous position
of subjecting "Convention claims to the vagaries of international
'15 9
politics.
A more substantive concern raised in the context of the
Convention against Torture, affecting not only aggravated felons but
all foreign nationals who make Article 3 claims, is that the United
States may be interpreting Article 3 more narrowly than most or all
of their international counterparts.16 0 The "more likely than not"
burden of proof appears to be more stringent than that applied by
other nations, at least in this relatively early stage of the
Convention's existence. 161 The United States does not extend Article
3 protections to family members of a successful Convention
claimant. 162 Moreover, a foreign national who is conferred protection
under the Convention against Torture does not receive legal
permanent residency, which automatically carries the benefit of
permission to work in the United States. 163 Foreign Nationals who
have not been convicted of particularly serious crimes also may be
subject to a reopening of their cases if conditions in their home
countries change, although they are not subjected to the problematic
streamlined procedures that make it easy for the government to
initiate an unlimited number of removal proceedings against a
Section 241(b)(3)(ii) foreign national. 164 The effect of the United
States' treatment of Convention claimants, thus, is to greatly impinge
on the security of the Convention's benefit for the foreign national
because the benefit received by the foreign national is subject to
change at any time at which the foreign national's home country is
165
determined a safe place for the foreign national.
Once again, the United States' compliance with international
law is not demonstrably within the spirit of the treaty-or, at least,
its implementation of the treaty is not as rigorously protective of
foreign nationals' human rights as that of its international
counterparts. 1 66 Compounding the problem, in July of 2003, the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims held an oversight hearing to air concerns and
propose changes related to the deferral provision available to
otherwise deportable foreign nationals based upon the Convention

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Rosati, supranote 152, at 16.
See Montavon-McKillip, supra note 148, at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260-61.
Id.
Id. at 260.
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against Torture. 16 7 During that hearing, members of the
Subcommittee criticized the anti-torture provision, characterizing it
68
as a "disturbing and dangerous loophole" for foreign criminals.'
3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
As mentioned above, the Universal Declaration is not a binding
treaty, it is simply a declaration that provides guidance in settling
issues of international human rights law. 169 While U.S. courts have
used the Universal Declaration in interpreting domestic laws on at
least a few occasions, 170 the recognition of the human rights
protections in the Universal Declaration has largely been limited to
circumstances in which the norms at issue "rise to the level of jus
cogens."'17 1 Thus, in such cases, the Universal Declaration is
essentially an extraneous source of authority and has not developed
consequential legal teeth of its own in the United States.
The right to family life that was put forth in the Universal
Declaration and has subsequently appeared in a treaty to which the
United States is a party, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, is particularly relevant to the mandatory deportation
provision for aggravated felons. 172 Article 16.3 of the Declaration
states that "[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit17of3
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.'
Article 12 states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his . . . family."'174 Further, Article 9 prohibits
arbitrary exile of individuals. 175 In the context of deportation of
aggravated felons when the Section 212(c) waiver is available (in
cases arising prior to April 1997), U.S. courts have recognized the
right to family life as a principle of international customary law and
have identified it as a factor to consider in granting relief from

167.
News Advisory: Hostettler Subcommittee Hearing Friday on Alien
Criminals and Human Rights Violators Being Released onto U.S. Streets Because of the
Convention Against Torture (July 10, 2003), at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
news071003.htm.
Rachel L. Swarns, Lawmakers Attack Immigrants' Use of Antitorture Law
168.
to Block Deportation,N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at A8.
See discussion supranote 109 and accompanying text.
169.
170.
See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1338 (10th Cir.
1981); Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
171.
kidnapping is not a jus cogens norm). Examples of jus cogens norms are torture,
murder, genocide, and slavery.
172.
See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Universal Declaration, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, U.N.
173.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
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deportation.1 7 6 However, with the enactment of IIRIRA and the
elimination of the discretionary waiver, no factors may be considered;
no relief from deportation may be granted. 177 Given that the right to
family life, and freedom of unnecessary interference with that right,
has already been recognized by at least some courts in the United
States, it seems all the more clear that the mandatory deportation of
aggravated felons who have long-term, family ties in the United
States is at odds with international law.
Furthermore, because there is no review of the underlying facts
of the criminal offense that mandates deportation, 7 8 and because
many case examples show that those underlying facts reveal at times
179
that the triggering offense was not a very serious or dangerous one,
it is hard to construe the mandatory deportation scheme as nonarbitrary. The scheme simultaneously reaches foreign nationals who
pose a serious threat to the public, and foreign nationals who have
committed non-dangerous, sometimes trivial, crimes and led
otherwise exemplary lives. If the mandatory deportation regime is in
fact arbitrary, it runs contrary to the Universal Declaration
prohibitions against arbitrary exile and arbitrary interference with
80
family life.'
4. The United States' Conflicting Interest in Compliance with
International Law and Sovereignty in the Field of Immigration
One U.S. court has held that in order to bring the INA into
conformance with several international treaties and customary
international law, a foreign national ordered deported on the grounds
of an aggravated felony conviction must be allowed a hearing to show
that his deportation would result in "extreme hardship" to his
family. 18 1 In that case, Beharry v. Reno, the district court limited its
decision to a narrow set of circumstances, holding that the facially
inapplicable Section 212(h) waiver would be available to certain
aliens:
The statutory provision 'No waiver shall be provided ...

if ...

the alien

has been convicted of an aggravated felony' should be narrowly
construed so as to accord with international law. That can be done by
ruling that section 212(h) waivers are available for aliens, including
petitioner, who meet its stringent requirements for seven years
residence and 'extreme hardship' to family-if these aliens have been
convicted of an 'aggravated felony' as defined after they committed

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See, e.g., Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
See discussion infra Part I.C.
Id.
See supra Part I.
Universal Declaration, supra note 173.
Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
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their crime, but which was no so categorized when they committed the
crime.

182

Section 212(h) permits a waiver of deportation for foreign nationals
who have not been admitted to the United States as lawful
permanent residents but have resided in the country for a continuous
period of seven years and can show special reasons why deportation
would cause extreme hardship to a citizen spouse or child. 183 Beharry
was admitted as a lawful permanent resident. 184 Section 212(h) has
been the subject of numerous equal protection challenges due to its
availability to persons residing in the country illegally, but not to
those residing here legally none of those challenges has succeeded to
18 5
date.
Beharry raised the hopes of immigrant advocates because despite
the long-standing presumption employed by courts that a statute
should be construed as consistent with international law unless no
other construction is possible, no U.S. court had ever accepted an
argument based on international law in the context of deportation on
"aggravated felony" grounds. 186 In the summer of 2003, however, the
District Court decision in Beharry was overruled by the Second
187
Circuit Court of Appeals.
While the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision
specifically on the ground that Beharry had not exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him because he had not asked
for a Section 212(h) waiver at his initial deportation hearing before
the Immigration Judge, the Court also noted that "[n]othing in our
decision to reverse on other grounds . . . should be seen as an

endorsement of the district court's holding that interpretation of the
'188
INA in this case is influenced or controlled by international law.
At the same time the Second Circuit also stated that it "would not
have been futile" for Beharry to raise his 212(h) claim before the
immigration judge. 189 Thus it is unclear what, if any, impact these
decisions may have on future judicial interpretations of the INA and
its conflicts with international law. However, given the long line of
precedent denying foreign nationals convicted of aggravated felonies
any relief, and the clear statutory mandate against such relief,
change in the law and its application appears unlikely to come from
the courts.

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 586.
Id.; see also Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS, 291 F.3d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 2002).

186.
Laura Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domestic
Immigration Law and InternationalHuman Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983, 998 (2002).
187.
188.
189.

Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 63.
Id.
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Immigration is an area in which the sovereignty of U.S. law is
jealously guarded because the right to regulate immigration is
inherent in the concept of sovereignty. 190 As such, it is one of the
areas in which the United States is most reluctant to comply with
international law.' 9 1 It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss in
detail the necessity or importance of compliance with international
law and all of the implications thereof. However, keeping in mind
that the provisions governing deportations on aggravated felony
grounds directly contravene some seminal human rights treaties, it is
worth noting a couple of fundamental political and practical reasons
for respecting norms of international human rights law. 19 2 Members
of the international community are increasingly skeptical of U.S.
adherence to the human rights principles it promotes, due to its
attachment to the death penalty, its recent treatment of non-citizen
detainees, and its reluctance to become a member of international
agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, 193 the comprehensive test ban
treaty or the landmines convention, 194 and the International
Criminal Court. 19 5 Countries with far worse human rights records
than the United States frequently use these notorious human rights
196
demerits as "diplomatic ammunition" against the United States.
The country's credibility with the international community would be
greater if it abided by the terms of its agreements, and it might thus
encounter a more cooperative spirit from other countries whenever it
seeks international support for its own initiatives, such as those it
recently undertook in Afghanistan and Iraq. 19 7 Perhaps more

Adams, supra note 186, at 997.
190.
191.
Id.
192.
For further discussion of the merits and drawbacks of adherence to
concepts of international human rights law, see generally, e.g., Adams, supra note 186;
Natasha Fain, Human Rights within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence, 21
BERKELEY J. INVL L. 607 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights
Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293 (2002); Hiroshi Motomura,
Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999).
193.
Emma Lewis, Colin Powell Faces Anti-US Summit Jeers, W. DAILY PRESS,
Sept. 5, 2002, at 2 ('The United States has been strongly criticized by leaders and
activists at the summit for President George Bush's decision last year to reject the
Kyoto Protocol.").
194.
See Peter Willetts, Saddam and Bush Isolated, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8,2003, at
10 ('"There is near universal antipathy to US hypocrisy. Much is made of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, yet the US has refused to ratify the comprehensive test
ban treaty or the landmines convention.").
See Guy Dinmore, A Prudent Soldier Fighting on the Battlefield of
195.
Diplomacy, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003 at P13 (Colin Powell's political capital abroad has
been eroded by the president's perceived litany of errors, from the U.S. refusing to
ratify the International Criminal Court, to its rejection of arms control treaties.").
196.
Koh, supra note 192, at 310.
197.
See Pamela Bone, The Moral Doubts about 'Peace', THE AGE, Feb. 20, 2003,
at 17 ("When it calls for international unity, the Bush Administration would have more
credibility if it were not so jealous of America's own national sovereignty.'); All Things
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importantly, from a policy perspective, the United States has held
itself out as a global model for recognition of human rights,
particularly in the last century. To maintain its credibility as a
committed leader in the field of human rights, and successfully to
influence other governments to uphold the human rights of
individuals within their own borders, it is arguable that the United
States needs to be more rigorous in its own application of
98
international human rights law.'

B. Mandatory DeportationRaises Significant Legal and Policy
Concerns within the Domestic Arena
Turning briefly to an important constitutional concern raised by

the mandatory deportation scheme, 199 foreign nationals present in
the United States have consistently been held to be entitled to the
200
constitutional protection of due process in deportation proceedings.
However, the right to due process in deportation proceedings is more
relaxed than in criminal proceedings, because courts have also
persistently held that deportation is a civil sanction, not a criminal
punishment: "Because removal proceedings are civil rather than
criminal, various due process protections normally associated with
criminal trials are not required. ' 20 1 Examples of due process
protections that are not present in deportation proceedings are a
right to appointed counsel 20 2 and adherence to the Federal Rules of

Evidence.

20 3

Considered: U.N. Security Council Agreement Essential to Legitimize an Attack on Iraq
(NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 18, 2003) ('The French argue that if America attacks Iraq
without consensus, it will be a victory for the law of the strongest, and they are right.").
198.
Even before the Bush administration's post-September 11 adoption of
policies that have drawn much criticism from human rights watchers, the director of
Amnesty International expressed his concerns about Washington's observation of
international human rights law. See Thera Lue Bird, Threat to Freedom, SALT LAKE
TRIB., July 9, 2001, at A6 (citing President Bush's opposition to the International
Criminal Court: "William Schulz, director of Amnesty International USA, said the
United States no longer has a prominent government leader sounding the call for
human rights.").
199.
Many scholars have urged various constitutional arguments relating to the
mandatory deportation scheme. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the
Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the limited Scope of Proposed Reform, 113
HARv. L. REV. 1936 (2000). The scope here is limited to due process concerns arising
from the characterization of deportation as a civil, rather than a criminal, sanction.
200.
See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 276 (1966).
201.
U.S. v. Fernandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2002).
202.
Julmiste v. Ashcroft, 212 F. Supp. 2d 341, 349 (D.N.J. 2002).
203.
Obianuju-Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2002) ('The sole
test governing the admission of evidence in deportation proceedings is whether the
evidence is probative and whether its admission is fundamentally fair.")
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The characterization of deportation as nonpunitive is at best
questionable. 20 4 Judge Learned Hand "likened deportation to exile, 'a
dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all
civilized people.' 20 5 Given the absence of any public safety or
deterrence rationale for retroactive application of new rules to deport
an individual for a minor, decades-old infraction, the characterization
of deportation as a nonpunitive sanction in the case of a foreign
national such as Jose Velasquez is untenable. 206 As Robert Pauw
argues, "[i]n these cases, where the person is deported without any
possible consideration of the remedial purposes of the statute and
there are no waivers available to ensure that the civil sanction is
fairly calibrated to the remedial goal, the statutory framework is
inherently penal. '20 7 Pauw states that at least some additional due
process protections should be imposed in deportation proceedings
20 8
when the ground for removal is an aggravated felony conviction.
His argument that deportation in aggravated felony cases is in fact
punitive, 20 9 and thus deserving of fuller due process protection, is a
strong one. It seems self-evident that deportation is punitive when it
is automatically triggered by the conviction of a crime with no regard
to the public threat posed by the offender. What other justification, if
not public safety, can there be for mandating the deportation of
foreign nationals who commit any of such a broad range of crimes?
The characterization of deportation as nonpunitive raises a
noteworthy policy concern. In calling deportation nonpunitive despite
its overwhelmingly punitive consequences-separation from family,
return to what may be a completely unfamiliar country where the
foreign national has no familial or linguistic ties, or economic lossneither Congress nor the courts face the question of whether such
foreign nationals should be punished in such an extreme manner.

204.
See discussion supra note 1 and accompanying text.
205.
Mae Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction
and DeportationPolicy in the United States, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 96 (2003).
206.
See id.
207.
Robert Pauw, A New Look at Why Deportationis Punishment, Why at Least
Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 305, 339 (2000).
208.
Id. at 338.
209.
Id. at 325.
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IV. COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATION

A. Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and the
Deportationof CriminalForeignNationals
In addition to reexamining the international law to which the
United States is a party, Congress could glean from the policies and
practices of its European allies that human rights concerns implicate
the current U.S. mandatory deportation scheme for foreign nationals
convicted of "aggravated felonies" as draconian and inhumane.
Governing all member states of the European Union, Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights requires that a
proportionality test be applied when the expulsion of a resident alien
is at issue, particularly when that alien is integrated into the society
of the expelling country, however serious the underlying offense may
be.

2 10

Sue Farran notes that the European Commission on Human
Rights has consistently held "that only in exceptional circumstances
will it be considered proportionate to deport an alien to a country
where he has no family or other social links. '2 11 For example, in
Moustaquim v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights held
that it was disproportionate to deport a Moroccan national, who had
lived in Belgium since the age of three, after he was charged with
numerous counts of theft-related crimes and assault crimes as a
juvenile. 2 12 The court relied heavily upon the right to family life in
finding that, despite the Belgian government's legitimate interest in
preventing disorder, the deportation order against Moustaquim
unlawfully interfered with his right to a family and private life. In
particular, the court noted that Moustaquim had spent almost all of
2 13
his life in Belgium and that all of his family resided there.
The proportionality test required by Article 8 calls for the
balancing of two goals: (1) maintenance of public order and safety,
and (2) protection of alien residents against the harsh result of
expulsion from their homes and families where the totality of
circumstances show that deportation would be inequitable.2 14 The
standard to be applied in determining whether public safety concerns
outweigh individual hardship is whether deportation is "necessary in

210.
See generally Colin Warbrick, The Structure of Article 8, 1998 EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 32, 32-44.
211.
Sue Farran, Facing Contemporary Challenges, 22 EuR. L. REV., HRS/17HRS/31 (1997).
212.
Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 EUR. CT. H.R. (Ser. A) at 9 (1991).
213.
Id.
214.
See generally Farran, supranote 211.
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a democratic society. ''215 The flexibility of this standard allows courts
to consider a wide range of factors in determining the deportability of
a criminal resident foreign national, including the span of time the
foreign national has lived in the country, the age of the foreign
national at the time of the commission of the underlying offenses, and
the family ties the foreign national has within the expelling country
and within his country of origin. 216 Further, a court may consider,
among a multitude of other factors, whether the criminal foreign
national will face a significant risk of harm in her home country if
217
deported.
B. Deporting CriminalForeignNationals in the United Kingdom
While Article 8 sets a basic standard for its member states in the
consideration of deportation of criminal foreign nationals, the United
Kingdom has a statutory scheme that serves as a useful model for
legislating the deportation of criminal foreign nationals. 218 Four
features in particular that distinguish it from the harsh rules of the
U.S. mandatory deportation of aggravated felons are: (1) the
recommendation to deport a criminal alien is a discretionary one that
weighs the proportionality of deportation against the gravity of the
underlying criminal offense and the individual factors that render
deportation a harsh consequence for resident aliens; (2) the initial
exercise of discretion occurs at the criminal court; (3) a
recommendation order of deportation of a criminal alien is subject to
appeal in a higher court, and (4) where there is a judicial
recommendation, the Secretary of State, who exercises deportation
authority, confirms the final deportation decision. 219 The wide
discretion conferred upon criminal and appellate courts in making
deportation recommendations regarding criminal foreign nationals
allows the government to protect public safety and national security
interests while avoiding the inequitable deportation of long-time
resident foreign nationals, such as that of Velasquez, discussed
220
above.
R. v. Hikmet Bozat and Others illustrates the usefulness of a
discretionary scheme in the criminal alien context. 221 In this case, the
British appellate court considered the deportation recommendation of

215.
Moustaquim, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 9.
216.
Id.
217.
See Ann Sherlock & John Anderws, Judgments of the Court of Human
Rights-Human Rights Survey 1997, 1998 EUR. L. REV. HR/120, HRI121 (discussing
Aydin v. Turkey, 25 E.H.R.R.R. 251 (1998)).
218.
See Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77 (Eng.).
219.
Id.
220.
See id. pt. I.
221.
R. v. Hikmet Bozat and Others, 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 270 (1996).
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three foreign nationals convicted of conspiracy to commit arson with
intent to endanger life. 22 2 One of the three, Ozen, was eighteen years
old at the time of the offense, more than ten years younger than the
other two charged as co-conspirators. 223 The criminal court had found
no evidence of conspiracy against Ozen except for his relatively
inactive participation in the substantive offense. 224 The appellate
court described Ozen as a "conscientious, hard-working student, a
22 5
respectable young man who had never been in any trouble before.1
The court took into account the fact that Ozen had resided in the
United Kingdom since the age of thirteen, that his close family
resided in the United Kingdom and were supportive of him, that he
was "clearly well thought of in his community," and that he had
continued to pursue his education while in prison.22 6 Reasoning that
his youthful immaturity and susceptibility to being misled by senior
persons in his community probably "played its part in [his] offences,"
the court quashed Ozen's-but not those of the other convicted
22 7
conspirators-deportation recommendations.
C. Congress Should Amend the Deportation Scheme of Criminal
ForeignNationals,Borrowing the Basic Structure of the United
Kingdom's CorrespondingProvision
By placing the initial exercise of discretion with the criminal
court judge, the United Kingdom's criminal deportation scheme
enables the court that has first-hand access to the facts of the
underlying criminal case to make a preliminary recommendation for
deportation. 2 28 The criminal court judge has the opportunity to
evaluate the seriousness of the actual crime in considering the
necessity of deportation.2 29 Furthermore, because the trial judge
makes a decision regarding deportation, and because the British case
law requires trial judges to "spell out the reasons for making a
recommendation for deportation," 230 a record is made of the firsthand observations made by the criminal court that inform the
decision. Thus, an appellate court would have access to information
such as the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility, the level of
remorse displayed by the alien-defendant, the level of the defendant's
participation in the crime, and other helpful underlying facts and
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224.
225.
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227.
228.
229.
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circumstances. 231 In contrast, the rigid schedule of aggravated
felonies under Section 101(a)(43), coupled with the Section
237(a)(2)(iii) deportation requirement, prohibits judges at all levels
from considering the facts surrounding any particular crime, or the
gravity thereof. The sole determination for immigration and appellate
by a foreign national meets the
courts is whether a crime committed
2 32
expansive 101(a)(43) definition.
Because the lack of judicial discretion in the U.S. statutory
scheme is rendered particularly unacceptable by the very broad,
comprehensive character of the "aggravated felony" definition, it is
critical that Congress revise the INA provisions which prohibit
judicial review of deportations based on criminal convictions. The
United Kingdom's conferral of a right to appellate review of
European
with the
coupled
recommendations,
deportation
Convention's requirement that a proportionality test be employed,
conforms more closely to notions of due process for resident foreign
nationals than do the U.S. provisions. 2 33 The British statute enables
courts to demonstrate sensitivity to the harsh consequences that
follow deportation in some cases: "the courts have no wish to break up
families or impose hardship on innocent people and the court is
required to consider the effect an order recommending deportation
'23 4
will have on others who are not before the court.
Application of this kind of consideration would benefit the family
of Jose Velasquez. If a court balanced the risk Velasquez might pose
to society against the hardship that would be imposed on his wife of
more than thirty years, his children, and his siblings, the court would
almost certainly find that deportation would unjustifiably harm
Velasquez's family. An appellate court may, at times, be in a better
position than a criminal court to apply this kind of balancing test
because the role of the appellate court is not focused on punishment
to the same extent the role of a criminal trial court is. Perhaps most
importantly, the application of a proportionality standard would
bring the deportation of criminal foreign nationals within the genuine
requirements of due process. Though it goes against a long line of
precedent, it is imperative that the punitive aspects of deportation be
acknowledged in the context of deportation, at least where
deportation decisions rely on criminal grounds. Where public safety is
not a viable rationale for deportation, as it is not in the case of Jose
Velasquez and many others like him, the most readily discernible
explanation for deportation is that it is punishment for breaking the
law.

Id.
231.
INA § 242(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
232.
For a general discussion of the problems of the absence of judicial review in
233.
the deportation context see Pauw, supra note 46.
R. v.Hikmet Bozart, 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) at 275.
234.
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For these reasons, Congress should reinstate some form of
discretionary consideration of crime-based deportation orders. The
212(c) waiver was a preferable measure to the current total absence
of relief, but, even better would be one similar to the British scheme,
in which there is no presumption for deportation based on an
arbitrarily comprehensive list of crimes. 235 Rather, a deportation
recommendation is a measure available to a trial court, but it is not to
be imposed unless a balancing test is performed that requires
consideration of whether the alien-defendant poses a threat to the
public and consideration of the harm to the alien-defendant and his
family if he is deported.
Finally, in support of a statutory scheme that resembles that of
the United Kingdom, once the judicial recommendations are made,
the ultimate discretion of the British Secretary of State over
deportation power allows a final check to ensure that resident foreign
nationals are being deported in conformity with public safety and
national security policies. 23 6 The courts recognize that the Secretary
of State "has access to information that is not available to the court
''23 7
about circumstances pertaining in the offender's country of origin.
As such, if Congress were to adopt a similar system, the Department
of Homeland Security would be able to evaluate the advisability of a
deportation order in light of the risk that a deportee might be subject
to torture or persecution in his home country and in light of national
security concerns.

V. CONCLUSION

The notion that a criminal sentencing judge should play a part in
the deportation decision regarding a criminal foreign national is not
foreign to U.S. immigration law. Prior to 1990, criminal sentencing
judges had a limited role in the deportation process for foreign
nationals who had been convicted of "crimes of moral turpitude,"2 38 a
category of crimes that existed long before the creation of "aggravated
felony" category in the INA. 239 When a criminal judge was sentencing
a foreign national who had committed an offense that would qualify
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See discussion supra note 218 and accompanying text.
236.
R. v. Hikmet Bozat, 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) at 274-76.
237.
Id. at 275.
238.
Taylor & Wright, supra note 46, at 1143.
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The category of "crime of moral turpitude" is still present in the INA. The
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dramatic because discretionary waiver is still available unless multiple convictions of
such crimes put an alien within the scope of an aggravated felony. Over its history the
"crime of moral turpitude" has been the subject of much controversy. See generally Jay
Wilson, The Definitional Problems with "Moral Turpitude," 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 261
(1991).
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as a crime of moral turpitude, the sentencing judge could, within her
discretion, recommend that the offender not be deported. 240 The INS
was bound by the sentencing judge's recommendation in so far as the
criminal ground for deportation was concerned. 24 1 The legislative
history of the 1917 statute that empowered criminal judges to
recommend against deportation reveals that Congress believed
sentencing judges were in the best position to evaluate whether
deportation of a criminal foreign national was necessary.2 42 Congress
should reconsider its severance of the criminal sentencing judge from
the deportation process. The U.K. statutory scheme for deportation of
criminal foreign nationals is preferable to the current U.S. model
because it has a flexibility of application that would protect a foreign
national like Jose Velasquez from summary deportation; it allows
sentencing judges who are more intimately familiar with a foreign
national's crime and profile have some input into the deportation
decision; and it preserves both a foreign national's right to appeal to a
higher court and the state's right to perform its function of ensuring
243
public safety and national security.
More important than the adoption of a particular remedy,
however, is that Congress address the problems created by AEDPA
and IIRIRA in some manner. Ultimately, the law should be changed
because in its present form it leads to some fundamentally unfair and
absurd results.
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